San Francisco
So why is that we keep making the same mistakes? The belligerence between Russia and Georgia demonstrates once again humankind's collective inability – often, it’s really our politically convenient unwillingness – to learn from our mistakes. Yes, Russia is the much-larger aggressor here. Moscow has far more blood on its hands than Tbilisi and it has earned our strong condemnation. Yet it was Georgia that naively succumbed to Moscow’s constant school-yard provocations by choosing to attack South Ossetia in the first place. It was just the excuse Russia craved to help "liberate" its "citizens" and occupy two breakaway territories - lest we forget Abkhazia, too. Russia's espoused concern for human rights in South Ossetia and Abkhazia is ludicrous in the face of its own historic atrocities stifling breakaway territories in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia and elsewhere throughout the Caucuses.
Behind Georgia’s patently stupid move, however, are some American hawks eager to revive the traditional Russian menace. Blaming ambiguous terrorists for everything has stretched pretty thin in recent years, so some armchair warriors welcome the return of a tangible, familiar enemy that you can actually locate on a map. Sure, the Georgians are to be commended for choosing democracy and Western integration, irrespective of President Saakashvilli's imprudence and impetuousness. We are right to support Tbilisi in this regard for there is little that Putin’s Russian fears more than real democracy. As is too often the case, however, we have overplayed our hand.
First, we have been relentless in taunting the Russian bear from its post-Cold War sleep. Hasn’t much of 20th century history underscored the intensity of Russian nationalism that we so brazenly helped reignite during the Clinton Administration and fanned furiously during the Bush years? One look at Versailles in the rear view mirror shows the limits of bullying a bully when he is momentarily down. Our support for Kosovar independence and Georgian, Ukranian and Baltic integration into NATO, while conceptually correct, have been implemented with incompetence in consistently creating new opportunities to rub the Russian nose in our Cold War "victory." Add to this the painful decision to place American missile defense assets in Poland and the Czech Republic and, well, can Dr. Strangelove be far away? Poland had been thoughtful in its considered nervousness about this new conceit, which Russian aggression in Georgia ironically eviscerated.
Next, we undoubtedly helped create expectations in Tbilisi that the United States would somehow come to Georgia's rescue when Russia repelled its clumsy invasion, fueled as it was by U.S. arms and logistics. Did President Saakashvilli actually expect U.S. forces to confront Russian troops on the Russian border? Some in the U.S. raised Hungarian expectations about our possible role in their 1956 revolution. Yet there was nothing we could have done to support the Budapest revolutionaries in frontal military terms then, which is also true in Georgia now. If hindsight in that rear view mirror is so perfect, why do we remain blind to the mismatch between theoretical expectations and practical capabilities in these scenarios? The Georgians should have understood we could not have - and should not have - saved their bacon with any direct military action. The mere thought of it is utterly preposterous!
Finally, we have no direct military card to play anyway. Our Army and Marine Corps forces are spread too thin in Afghanistan and Iraq to give any bite to our rhetoric. History repeatedly shows that Russia will pounce when it understands that an adversary is too weak to act on its rhetoric. That rear view mirror makes vivid a post-Vietnam America embroiled in the Iran hostage crisis with neither the might nor the will to respond militarily to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Moscow understood this fact, although its ill-conceived, unjust invasion of Afghanistan was a major contributor to its unraveling. Still, one price of the war in Iraq is that it robs our capacity to wage an effective war in Afghanistan and respond to other contingencies around the world.
The Giants' Aaron Rowand was called out on this play. From our perch in the first row at AT&T Park, he was safe.
So why is that we keep making the same mistakes? The belligerence between Russia and Georgia demonstrates once again humankind's collective inability – often, it’s really our politically convenient unwillingness – to learn from our mistakes. Yes, Russia is the much-larger aggressor here. Moscow has far more blood on its hands than Tbilisi and it has earned our strong condemnation. Yet it was Georgia that naively succumbed to Moscow’s constant school-yard provocations by choosing to attack South Ossetia in the first place. It was just the excuse Russia craved to help "liberate" its "citizens" and occupy two breakaway territories - lest we forget Abkhazia, too. Russia's espoused concern for human rights in South Ossetia and Abkhazia is ludicrous in the face of its own historic atrocities stifling breakaway territories in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia and elsewhere throughout the Caucuses.
Behind Georgia’s patently stupid move, however, are some American hawks eager to revive the traditional Russian menace. Blaming ambiguous terrorists for everything has stretched pretty thin in recent years, so some armchair warriors welcome the return of a tangible, familiar enemy that you can actually locate on a map. Sure, the Georgians are to be commended for choosing democracy and Western integration, irrespective of President Saakashvilli's imprudence and impetuousness. We are right to support Tbilisi in this regard for there is little that Putin’s Russian fears more than real democracy. As is too often the case, however, we have overplayed our hand.
First, we have been relentless in taunting the Russian bear from its post-Cold War sleep. Hasn’t much of 20th century history underscored the intensity of Russian nationalism that we so brazenly helped reignite during the Clinton Administration and fanned furiously during the Bush years? One look at Versailles in the rear view mirror shows the limits of bullying a bully when he is momentarily down. Our support for Kosovar independence and Georgian, Ukranian and Baltic integration into NATO, while conceptually correct, have been implemented with incompetence in consistently creating new opportunities to rub the Russian nose in our Cold War "victory." Add to this the painful decision to place American missile defense assets in Poland and the Czech Republic and, well, can Dr. Strangelove be far away? Poland had been thoughtful in its considered nervousness about this new conceit, which Russian aggression in Georgia ironically eviscerated.
Next, we undoubtedly helped create expectations in Tbilisi that the United States would somehow come to Georgia's rescue when Russia repelled its clumsy invasion, fueled as it was by U.S. arms and logistics. Did President Saakashvilli actually expect U.S. forces to confront Russian troops on the Russian border? Some in the U.S. raised Hungarian expectations about our possible role in their 1956 revolution. Yet there was nothing we could have done to support the Budapest revolutionaries in frontal military terms then, which is also true in Georgia now. If hindsight in that rear view mirror is so perfect, why do we remain blind to the mismatch between theoretical expectations and practical capabilities in these scenarios? The Georgians should have understood we could not have - and should not have - saved their bacon with any direct military action. The mere thought of it is utterly preposterous!
Finally, we have no direct military card to play anyway. Our Army and Marine Corps forces are spread too thin in Afghanistan and Iraq to give any bite to our rhetoric. History repeatedly shows that Russia will pounce when it understands that an adversary is too weak to act on its rhetoric. That rear view mirror makes vivid a post-Vietnam America embroiled in the Iran hostage crisis with neither the might nor the will to respond militarily to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Moscow understood this fact, although its ill-conceived, unjust invasion of Afghanistan was a major contributor to its unraveling. Still, one price of the war in Iraq is that it robs our capacity to wage an effective war in Afghanistan and respond to other contingencies around the world.
The Giants' Aaron Rowand was called out on this play. From our perch in the first row at AT&T Park, he was safe.