This is the first in a series of ongoing entries entitled Vision. We will regularly focus in this space on leadership and organizational vision and why, at once, they are much ballyhooed and just as frequently ridiculed.
Visions must tell us where we are going as an organization and why it matters. At best, they create vivid, compelling and directionally useful portraits of some future state and our role in achieving or creating it. Well beyond the empty rhetorical calories of "maximizing shareholder value" exist some visions that are truly inspired and inspiring. One such case in point is the Johnson & Johnson subsidiary DePuy Orthopaedics whose vision is "restoring the joy of motion for patients around the world." IMD Professor Michael Watkins has written that this is an "evocative encapsulation. It brings to mind great athletes who can return to competition or grandparents who can play with their grandchildren again." (Vision Decisions, Harvard Business Online, January 7, 2008.)
Vision statements run into trouble when they do not stretch people far enough or, conversely, when they stretch them too far. There is a fine line between strategically placing one's reach just ahead of one's grasp and simply tilting at windmills with Don Quixote-like impossibility. Here is where wisdom governed by facts makes all the difference.
Let's consider two presidential clarion calls in this context. President John F. Kennedy told a joint session of Congress in 1961, "I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth." Collins and Porras (1994) call such visions "Big Hairy Audacious Goals (BHAGs)." Yes, these visions are ambitious and daunting, but they also perform essential energizing, mobilizing and focusing roles. Why? Because they are doable. Kennedy and his aides knew that the science underscored the possibilities of a safe moon landing and return.
Collins and Porras also suggests the role that specificity plays in successful visioning. They write that "Kennedy and his advisors could have gone off into a conference room and drafted something like, 'Let's beef up the space program' or some other such vision statement." The specificity of landing on the moon and returning safely captured the public's imagination and the line added last minute to his speech that the United States would do so "before this decade is out" lent urgency to that specificity.
When President George H. Bush called for a $1.2 billion Hydrogen Fuel Initiative during his 2003 State of the Union speech, he offered America what, in the abstract, was a wonderful vision of our energy future. The President subsequently dropped this vision from speeches and policy formulations because, well, the facts suggested it was not practical or even particularly doable.
Yes, we all like the idea of clean hydrogen-powered automobiles, but Professor Robert Muller of Berkeley tells us (On Point Radio, July 21, 2008) that the scientific community was not able to get to the President or his political advisors until after the announcement. They ultimately told the White House that in liquid form hydrogen has less energy than gasoline by a factor of four. Furthermore, energy is not a fuel source, per se. You have to make it and making it costs substantial amount of money and requires widespread new infrastructure costing substantial amounts of money. Also, it takes coal or gas to manufacture hydrogen, emitting considerable carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Hydrogen cars may not pollute, but the processes used to create the hydrogen itself are enormously polluting. We will someday arrive at a point when hydrogen cars are possible. They are simply not possible on any meaningful scale right now or anywhere near a 20- or even 30-year horizon.
Visions need to be rooted in the doable and vetted by the people who know how to achieve them. Kennedy's vision animated a specific cause and moved us forward. Bush's vision caught our fancy but smashed upon the rocks of reality. Kennedy's informed vision was credible. Bush's uninformed vision detracted from his credibility. It's all a question of knowing how far to stretch and whether, in the final analysis, the vision is real enough to encourage anyone to try to stretch that far in the first place.
Visions must tell us where we are going as an organization and why it matters. At best, they create vivid, compelling and directionally useful portraits of some future state and our role in achieving or creating it. Well beyond the empty rhetorical calories of "maximizing shareholder value" exist some visions that are truly inspired and inspiring. One such case in point is the Johnson & Johnson subsidiary DePuy Orthopaedics whose vision is "restoring the joy of motion for patients around the world." IMD Professor Michael Watkins has written that this is an "evocative encapsulation. It brings to mind great athletes who can return to competition or grandparents who can play with their grandchildren again." (Vision Decisions, Harvard Business Online, January 7, 2008.)
Vision statements run into trouble when they do not stretch people far enough or, conversely, when they stretch them too far. There is a fine line between strategically placing one's reach just ahead of one's grasp and simply tilting at windmills with Don Quixote-like impossibility. Here is where wisdom governed by facts makes all the difference.
Let's consider two presidential clarion calls in this context. President John F. Kennedy told a joint session of Congress in 1961, "I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth." Collins and Porras (1994) call such visions "Big Hairy Audacious Goals (BHAGs)." Yes, these visions are ambitious and daunting, but they also perform essential energizing, mobilizing and focusing roles. Why? Because they are doable. Kennedy and his aides knew that the science underscored the possibilities of a safe moon landing and return.
Collins and Porras also suggests the role that specificity plays in successful visioning. They write that "Kennedy and his advisors could have gone off into a conference room and drafted something like, 'Let's beef up the space program' or some other such vision statement." The specificity of landing on the moon and returning safely captured the public's imagination and the line added last minute to his speech that the United States would do so "before this decade is out" lent urgency to that specificity.
When President George H. Bush called for a $1.2 billion Hydrogen Fuel Initiative during his 2003 State of the Union speech, he offered America what, in the abstract, was a wonderful vision of our energy future. The President subsequently dropped this vision from speeches and policy formulations because, well, the facts suggested it was not practical or even particularly doable.
Yes, we all like the idea of clean hydrogen-powered automobiles, but Professor Robert Muller of Berkeley tells us (On Point Radio, July 21, 2008) that the scientific community was not able to get to the President or his political advisors until after the announcement. They ultimately told the White House that in liquid form hydrogen has less energy than gasoline by a factor of four. Furthermore, energy is not a fuel source, per se. You have to make it and making it costs substantial amount of money and requires widespread new infrastructure costing substantial amounts of money. Also, it takes coal or gas to manufacture hydrogen, emitting considerable carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Hydrogen cars may not pollute, but the processes used to create the hydrogen itself are enormously polluting. We will someday arrive at a point when hydrogen cars are possible. They are simply not possible on any meaningful scale right now or anywhere near a 20- or even 30-year horizon.
Visions need to be rooted in the doable and vetted by the people who know how to achieve them. Kennedy's vision animated a specific cause and moved us forward. Bush's vision caught our fancy but smashed upon the rocks of reality. Kennedy's informed vision was credible. Bush's uninformed vision detracted from his credibility. It's all a question of knowing how far to stretch and whether, in the final analysis, the vision is real enough to encourage anyone to try to stretch that far in the first place.